We revisit the approach de ned in 2] for the formal veri cation of cryptographic protocols so as to allow for some mechanization in the veri cation process. In the original approach veri cation uses theorem proving. Here we show that for a wide range of practical situations and properties it is possible to perform the veri cation on a nite and safe abstract model.
Introduction
Formal veri cation of cryptographic protocols has recently received increased consideration due to the importance of cryptographic protocols in the design of new security or electronic commerce architectures. Many proof-based veri cation techniques have been proposed (see 2] for a discussion of this issue) to perform systematic analysis of large protocols. Although these approaches have been quite successful in identifying aws or as a support for the design of new electronic commerce protocols, they require signi cant resources during the veri cation process. Model-checking based techniques have recently been applied 9, 6 ] to the veri cation of such protocols. Veri cation is performed on a nite model that corresponds to an abstraction of the initial speci cation. The veri cation is thus automatic. But the proof that such abstractions are safe and do not compromise the generality and accuracy of the veri cation process has not yet been formalized in the case of cryptographic protocols. In the case of electronic commerce protocols, for which the coherence of data (e.g. price, order or payment information, etc.) is critical, nding a safe abstraction is a particularly crucial issue.
In this paper we propose a safe abstraction that can be incorporated into the framework proposed in 2]. Similar abstractions based on abstract interpretation techniques have been developed for the veri cation of temporal properties expressed using various branching-time temporal logics (e.g. 5, 3, 8, 4, 7, 10] ). Here we transpose some of the results of 3, 7, 10] to the veri cation of security properties. We also automatize the construction of the abstract model and the translation of security properties into abstract ones for a large class of practical situations. The proposed approach is currently being applied for the veri cation of large electronic commerce protocols 1 .
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asymmetric when di erent keys are used for encryption and decryption. For illustration purposes we use a very simple two message key distribution protocol:
(1) A ! S : (A; B) (2) S ! A : (K B ; B) K ?1 S This protocol description can be read as follows: (1) A sends a message to S to tell him that he is A and wants to get B's public key K B ; no encryption is used; (2) S replies to the request by sending A B's public key K B ; this message is encrypted (i.e. signed) with the private key K ?1 S which S is the only one to know and which thus authenticates the producer.
Following the approach of 2] we rst have to identify the di erent principals involved. Principals receive messages at one end and emit other messages at another end. Some principals will be considered to be \trustable" (i.e. to work according to their role in the protocol) and some not. Communications media are typically considered to be non-trustable, because messages can usually be intercepted, replayed, removed, or created by intruders. We will consider that this is the case in the following discussion. The set of untrustable principals is modelled as a single (black box) agent which is called the \external world" or, more concisely, the intruder. The intruder is modelled as a principal that may know some data initially and that will store and try to decrypt all data passed to him and thus in particular all information circulating on the communications media. The intruder will also be able to encrypt data to create new messages that will be sent to mislead other principals. But the intruder will be able to decrypt and encrypt data only with keys he knows. This modeling will in particular allow us to determine at any time which data are potentially known to the intruder under the chosen \trustability" hypothesis. The same protocol can be studied in terms of many di erent hypotheses.
According to 2], the knowledge of the intruder is formalized as a set of data components which range over the domain S. Data components range over the domain C and can be: basic data, which may be (1) cryptographic keys which take their values in domain KA (for asymmetric keys) or KS (for symmetric ones), (2) other basic data which will take their values in domain D; data obtained by composition (1) using the pair operator which takes some data c 1 and some c 2 and returns the pair (c 1 ; c 2 ), (2) or by encryption of some data c using key k which is noted c k . Messages that are exchanged over communication media are of type C. The domains S and C are formalized as:
figure (2) C is in fact de ned modulo (i.e. quotiented by) the two axioms 8k:k 2 KS 
D R A F T 3 Formalizing the Protocol
We then need to formally specify the protocol itself. This speci cation consists in the description of the role of each trustable agent. The formal speci cation of the protocol consists of a set of atomic actions. The sending and reception of a message are not synchronous. Consequently the transmission of a message is considered as two atomic actions, one for sending and one for receiving. More precisely, the formalization is based on the chemical reaction paradigm 1]: a system is described as a set of atomic actions which may be applied repeatedly, in any order and whenever their pre-condition holds. Our modeling of the key distribution protocol will thus distinguish 4 di erent kinds of atomic actions. These actions will be identi ed using the labels drawn from A = f1 A ; 1 S ; 2 S ; 2 A g. Each of the 4 labels n X of A stands for one action: principal X sends or receives message n.
The The rst action (i.e. 1a) describes A sending a pair composed of the identi cation of A and of the identi cation of the principal id for which the public key is requested. Each sending of a message msg increases the knowledge of the intruder, i.e. s 0 I = s I msg. The value of id is not constrained in any way. This allows A to request any public key he wishes.
The second action (i.e. 1s) describes S receiving a pair of data. This pair can be the pair just sent by A or any pair of data known by the intruder. The second case is only useful to the intruder if this can go undetected by A: here there is no particular checking other than on the form of the message. The third action (i.e. 2s) describes S sending a pair composed of the public D R A F T key of d and of the identi er d stored previously 2 . Receiving a message msg does not change the state of the intruder (i.e. s 0 I = s I ), but the message should be deducible from the knowledge of the intruder (i.e. msg known in s I ). The fourth action (i.e. 1s) implicitly speci es that the message was signed using K ?1 s . 3 4 Proving security properties Most security properties are safety properties 4 . They mainly rely on the fact that the intruder does not know some private data or is not able to construct the expected message. This is in both cases formalized as an invariant property, :(c known in s I ), where c stands for the private data in the rst case and is the message to construct in the second, and where s I is the data collected by the intruder. Con dentiality properties which are the simplest security properties, correspond to the situation where c is either a key or a basic data (e.g. a nonce, a credit card number, etc.). As an example, K ?1 S should remain unknown to the intruder. This is written :(K ?1 S known in s I ).
But some security properties cannot be written so as to t into the general form above. As an illustration we will use in the sequel two representative invariant properties drawn from 2].
The rst one will be referred to as invariant (1) 
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obligations that should be discharged using formal provers, whereas step (c) can be performed using model checking techniques. This was already the case in 7]. The bene t of this approach comes from the fact that both kinds of proof obligations are much simpler to perform than the proof of invariant inv for the initial concrete model M. But in order to perform step (c) we need to be able to perform the checking of inv a automatically on each reachable state of M a . The problem here comes from the fact that even when a limited number of keys and of basic data components is used, the computations that the intruder may perform (or the data that he can generate) are unbounded: e.g. starting from k the intruder can generate k k , k k k , etc.
In this section we thus provide a decision procedure for the known in predicate in the case where the parameters of known in are explicit (described by extension using a variable free expression). The ve basic operations that an intruder may use in order to exploit data were de ned in 2] and referred to as , 0 , , 0 and operations: for the encryption of a known data component using a known key, 0 for the decryption of a known data component using a known key, for the pairing of two known data components, 0 for the decomposition of a pair (i.e. obtaining the rst or second projection); and for data extraction. Each action was formalized as a state transformation relation: We recall here some of the properties that were proved in 2] and that we will use in the sequel. Lemma We then de ne a rst algorithm described using the chemical reaction paradigm. The algorithm is supposed to stop whenever a xed point is reached 7 Let us now consider the following algorithm which uses the previous one: 
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Now we improve on the approach proposed in the previous section by bringing some automation for steps (a) and (b). In step (a), given a logical formula p (e.g. p : (S (A C) S) !Bool de ned in section 3) we are looking for an abstract logical formula p a such that 8x:p(x) ) p a (ĥ(x)) (i.e. we consider that h is the identity function on labels of A). In step (b) given a logical formula p (e.g. p is inv) we are looking for an abstract logical formula p a (i.e. p a is inv a ) such that 8x:p a (ĥ(x)) ) p(x). The main di erence in both cases comes from the direction of the implication (i.e. it goes from concrete to abstract in the rst case and from abstract to concrete in the second). The goal will be said to be negative in the rst case and positive in the second. In both cases, formulae are supposed to be expressed in a very simple (typed) logical language de ned on C and S using the operators and connectors of basic set theory, i.e. _;^; 2; :; ), together with the prede ned predicate known in. For the sake of simplicity, quanti ers are omitted and free variables are considered to be universally quanti ed. The homomorphic extension ofĥ can now be de ned on this new language. In the sequel we will use the same notationĥ to refer to it because it generalizes the previous extensionĥ 8 . We rst consider the following preliminary result: =)ĥ(s i+1 ). 2 We now describe the main steps of an algorithm for checking that given a formula p and a goal (i.e. positive or negative), we can useĥ(p) as an abstract formula (i.e. p a =ĥ(p)).
The algorithm is based on the ten rules of gure (3) below and works as follows: we use the initial formula p and its associated sign as an initial goal; at each step we try to match the current logical formula 9 and its associated sign to the formula and sign part of a rule; if one of the rules (1) to (4) is matched, then each matching sub-expression, i.e. the sub-expression matching x and/or y; forms a new sub-goal that has to be checked recursively using the sign speci ed by the rule for the corresponding sub-expression 10 ; if one of the rules (5) to (10) is applied no new sub-goal is generated; the checking stops when all sub-goals have been checked, or a sub-goal does not match any rule. In the rst case the checking is said to be successful. 
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Formula Sign x y (1) x^y +=? +=? +=? (2) x _ y +=? +=? +=? (3) :x +=? ?=+ (4) x ) y +=? ?=+ +=?
Formula Sign (6) x 2 y ? (7) true; false +=? (8) c known in s ? (9) x = a s:t:ĥ ?1 (a) = fag + (10) a 2 e s:t:ĥ ?1 (a) = fag + figure (3) Proposition 7 The previous algorithms always terminates. Whenever it succeeds then taking p a to beĥ(p) we have 8x:p a (ĥ(x)) ) p(x) if the goal was positive and 8x:p(x) ) p a (ĥ(x)) otherwise.
Proof. The proof of termination is straightforward. The proof of correctness is done by structural induction on p. This leads to one induction step per rule. For the positive side of rule (1) we have to prove that given any four logical formulae q; q 0 ; q a ; q 0 a , that satisfy 8x:q a (ĥ(x)) ) q(x) and 8x:q 0 a (ĥ(x)) ) q 0 (x) then 8x:p a (ĥ(x)) ) p(x) where p = q^q 0 and p a = q a^q 0 a . For the negative side of rule (1) and for rules (2) to (7), the proof is similar. For rule (8) we just need to use proposition 6. For rule (9) (resp. for rule (10)) we use the fact thatĥ ?1 (a) = fag to prove that x 0 2ĥ ?1 (x) ) x 0 = a (resp. that e 0 2ĥ ?1 (e) ) a 2 e 0 ). 2
The algorithm will thus be used to mechanize steps (a) and (b) in all situations where the algorithm succeeds. In case of failure the unsatis ed sub-goals can still be discharged using theorem proving, or a new formula verifying the sub-goal can be proposed by the user. In practice it has always been quite easy to add new rules similar to rules (9) and (10) in the rare cases of failure of the algorithm.
As an illustration of the use of the proposed algorithm let us rst consider the rst kind of security properties, i.e. :(c known in s). The algorithm proceeds as follows: the initial goal is positive as it used for step (b); rule (3) is applied with a positive sign and with x matching sub-expression c known in s; in the column for x, we nd a negative sign associated to a positive goal (i.e. the sign of the goal is in the column \Sign", here on the left side of the column); thus a new negative sub-goal c known in s is generated; this negative sub-goal matches rule (8) and the checking succeeds. Thus the only problem here is to nd an adequate function h. We propose, h such that h(k) = if k = K ?1 S then K ?1 S else K andĥ(d) = D. For keys, h will return either K ?1 S or K. The second key, K, will necessarily be part of the intruder knowledge forĥ(M) (i.e. K ĥ (s I )), but the rst one K ?1 S should not be deducible fromĥ(s I ). It is private. The distinction between these two kinds of keys is essential here: at least one key must be private; the other ones which can be represented using (i.e. collapsed into) a single key K may be known by the intruder. The same distinction between private and non private data is on the other hand not useful here for basic data. Thus h will return the same value for all data in B, and this basic data does not need to be private (i.e. D known inĥ(s I )). After a few steps the knowledge of the intruder will thus typically beĥ(s I ) = K D (K; D) K ?1 S . The previous discussion is quite representative of issues that have to be considered during the identi cation of h. A misconception in h results in the identi cation of non existent aws, and can easily be xed by reducing some of the collapses formalized by h.
Let us now consider the example of invariant (1) 
Conclusion
We have shown how to automatize the formal veri cation of cryptographic protocols for a large variety of security properties. The proposed approach relies on the general theorem proving framework originally proposed in 2] and incorporates abstract interpretation inspired facilities, thus applying techniques developed for the veri cation of general temporal properties (i.e. 5, 3, 4, 7, 10]). We have rst transposed work in 3, 7, 10] to the framework of veri cation of security properties proposed in 2]. This entails providing a decision procedure for the intruder's (unbounded) knowledge. But we have also signi cantly improved the mechanization proposed in 7] by providing an algorithm for computing the abstract model and the abstract properties, given an abstraction function. The algorithm may fail to show that a particular sub-expression meets the sub-goal. In this situation, which is very rare in practice the user should then either prove manually that the problematic sub-expression indeed meets the sub-goal, or should provide a new sub-expression himself. An alternative, more restrictive, but probably more elegant approach would be to characterize the precise language for which the abstract property can be computed automatically and restrict the logic language that can be used for describing the protocol and for expressing security properties. We would then consider the checking algorithm of section 6 as a typing or static inference algorithm. In doing so we would obtain a complete mechanization in all cases once the abstraction function is provided. The approach that is proposed here for the veri cation of cryptographic protocols is somewhat more complex than the two model-checking based approaches proposed so far (i.e. 9] and 6]). This is mainly because the latter approaches do not encompass the rst abstraction phase, and the user has to provide the simpli ed nite model directly. There is thus a risk that the informal abstraction step implicitly performed by the user is unsafe and compromises the result of the analysis itself (by validating problematic protocols). The main objective of the proposed approach is indeed to prove the absence of aws, and not only to identify aws. The two kinds of approaches are thus complementary in their objectives. In order to cope with the abstraction problem, some guidelines are provided in 9] and are informally justi ed for the writing of the nite model. For example, the number of di erent keys that the intruder may use is speci ed. This number is independent of the protocol or of the property at hand. Even if this is acceptable in practice for many authentication protocols it is a severe limitation for more general cryptographic protocols, as it is quite easy to exhibit protocols for which problematic scenarios require larger numbers of distinct keys 11 . In the proposed approach, the number of distinct keys (featured by the size of D R A F T the set h(K), e.g. 2 and 3 in the examples of the previous section) will typically depend on the property and the protocol at hand.
Finally we believe that some of the results presented here are quite general and could also be used with pure model checking approaches. In 9] and 6], for example, the number of internal steps that the intruder may perform in order to deduce new data from existing one is implicitly bounded so as to keep the model nite. In many cases (i.e. for many protocols) this decision could be justi ed formally using the model and the results of 2]. But the decision algorithm proposed in section 5 in fact suppresses the need for such limitation of the number of steps, and could be used in conjunction with approaches like 9] and 6].
The approach is currently being applied successfully for the veri cation of large electronic commerce protocols 12 . The abstracted models experimented so far have always been very small in terms of the number of states. This is mainly due to the fact that in the proposed approach an abstract function has only to preserve the particular property for which it is provided and not a large class of properties as it is the case in other approaches such as 9], 6], or 5, 8] for example.
